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Abstract
We propose a unified structural credit risk model incorporating both insolvency and illiq-
uidity risks, in order to investigate how a firm’s default probability depends on the liquidity
risk associated with its financing structure. We assume the firm finances its risky assets by
mainly issuing short- and long-term debt. Short-term debt can have either a discrete or a
more realistic staggered tenor structure. At rollover dates of short-term debt, creditors face
a dynamic coordination problem. We show that a unique threshold strategy (i.e., a debt run
barrier) exists for short-term creditors to decide when to withdraw their funding, and this
strategy is closely related to the solution of a non-standard optimal stopping time problem
with control constraints. We decompose the total credit risk into an insolvency component
and an illiquidity component based on such an endogenous debt run barrier together with
an exogenous insolvency barrier.
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1
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has dramatically shown that financial markets are not ideal. In par-
ticular, refinancing in periods of financial distress can be extremely costly or even impossible due
to liquidity drying up in the market. It has been shown, for example by Adrian and Shin (2008,
2010) and Brunnermeier (2009), that the heavy use of short-term debt was a key contributing
factor to the credit crunch of 2007/2008. Firms, however, often prefer short-term debt financing
as it is cheaper than long-term debt. Moreover, as argued by He and Xiong (2012b), short-term
debt can also be regarded as a disciplinary device for firms and can be used to mitigate adverse
selection problems and to reduce the cost of auditing firms. Hence, several reasons support the
use of short-term financing. However, most of the existing credit risk models do not take into
account the rollover risk (or liquidity risk) inherent in short-term debt financing. It is the aim
of this paper to provide a unified framework that incorporates rollover risk as well as insolvency
risk. Within an extended structural credit risk model, our approach allows to investigate how a
firm’s default probability depends on the rollover risk inherent in its particular financing struc-
ture.
Structural credit risk models were initiated by Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976).
In these models default happens if the firm fundamental falls below some exogenous default
barrier which often relates to the firm’s debt level. A huge part of the literature on struc-
tural credit risk modeling focuses on how to model such an exogenous default barrier, as in
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Briys and de Varenne (1997), among others1. In the fol-
lowing we will call this exogenous default barrier the insolvency barrier. Given this exogenous
insolvency barrier, in this paper we derive an endogenous threshold value below which short-term
creditors decide to withdraw their funding, i.e., to run on the firm, and we will call this barrier
the debt run barrier. The latter depends on not only the firm’s creditworthiness but also the
creditors’ beliefs about the likelihood of a debt run in the remaining rollover periods. Deter-
mining this debt run barrier is the main problem of this paper. There is a third barrier, called
the illiquidity barrier, which represents the critical value when the firm is unable to pay off its
creditors in case of a debt run, and which is determined endogenously from the debt run barrier.
In addition, we show that the debt run barrier always dominates the illiquidity barrier, which in
turn dominates the insolvency barrier. This relationship among all three barriers not only helps
to decompose the total credit risk into an insolvency component and an illiquidity component,
but also illustrates the phenomenon that most firms have defaulted due to illiquidity rather than
due to insolvency in the recent credit crunch.
Our first contribution is the provision of a rigorous formulation for a class of structural credit
risk models that study debt runs. The classic debt/bank run model of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) features a static setting where all the depositors simultaneously decide whether or not to
withdraw their demand deposits from a solvent but illiquid bank. Ericsson and Renault (2006)
and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) provide further extensions that are, however, still in the static
setting. In this paper, we consider debt runs from a dynamic viewpoint. The debt run model
introduced by Morris and Shin (2010) focuses on a two-period setting where short-term credi-
tors face a binary decision in terms of global games at an interim time point. Liang et al. (2014)
provide a structural credit risk model that also takes liquidity risk into account, as short-term
1Optimal capital structural models are regarded as the second generation of structural credit risk models, which
were initiated by Leland (1994, 1998), and Leland and Toft (1996). Therein the firm defaults when its equity value
drops to zero, and the default barrier is determined endogenously by its equity holders. Hilberink and Rogers
(2002) and Chen and Kou (2009) extend this model by introducing jump risk, and recently, He and Xiong (2012a)
extended this framework by including an illiquid debt market.
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creditors can decide at a finite number of decision dates whether to roll over or to withdraw
their funding. They derive a debt/bank run barrier based on the comparison of binary strate-
gies for a representative short-term creditor. Technically, the generalization from the two-period
setting of Morris and Shin (2010) towards the multi-period setting of Liang et al. (2014) relies
on the dynamic programming principle (DPP). In Liang et al. (2014) the DPP was only applied
informally by comparing the expected returns for the two investment options of creditors at the
rollover dates. In this paper, by introducing an appropriate value function for a representative
short-term creditor, which describes the discounted expected return over the remaining rollover
periods and which is calculated based on the DPP, we derive the unique threshold strategy, i.e.,
the debt run barrier. The representative creditor decides to withdraw her funding if the firm’s
fundamental falls below this barrier at any decision date. In contrast to Liang et al. (2014), the
corresponding dynamic programming equations presented in this paper are more generic and
transparent, which in particular allows us to introduce flexible debt maturity structures into our
model.
The second contribution of this paper is the imbedding of flexible debt tenor structures into
such an extended structural credit risk model. In Liang et al. (2014) a discrete tenor structure is
assumed such that the rollover dates of short-term debt are given by a sequence of deterministic
numbers. This implies that all short-term debt expires and can be rolled over at the same time.
The problem is therefore equivalent to a one-creditor problem. In reality, however, firms typically
stagger the maturities for short-term debt to finance their long-term risky assets. Rollover risk
is partially reduced in this way as at each maturity date only a fraction of total debt is due.
Nevertheless, due to the maturity mismatch between the assets and the liabilities sides, the firm
is still exposed to significant liquidity risk. Our model covers both the discrete tenor structure
and the staggered tenor structure. The latter was first introduced by Leland (1994, 1998), and
Leland and Toft (1996), with Hilberink and Rogers (2002) and Chen and Kou (2009) providing
further technical details. The main idea is to assume a random duration of debt in order to
reflect the maturity mismatch. Recently, He and Xiong (2012b) applied the staggered maturity
structure to the debt run literature where debt maturities are modelled as arrival times of a
Poisson process, whose intensity can then be interpreted as the inverse of average debt dura-
tion. In this paper, we utilize a more general and flexible Cox process to model the staggered
tenor structure. The economic intuition of using the Cox maturity structure is that the average
duration of the short-term debt which a firm issues should fluctuate and depend on some eco-
nomic factors such as the firm fundamental or even the underlying systemic risk from the market.
The third contribution of this paper is that we use a reduced-form approach to model the
impacts of other creditors’ rollover decisions on the representative short-term creditor’s rollover
decision. In general, such impacts and the resulting equilibria are complicated as we need to
consider not only the impact of other creditors’ current rollover decisions, but also the impact of
their future decisions. In Morris and Shin (2010), they concentrate on the former impact, and
resort to a reduced-form approach by modeling the representative short-term creditor’s belief on
the proportion of creditors not rolling over their funding at each rollover date as a uniformly
distributed random variable exogenously. In He and Xiong (2012b), they concentrate on the lat-
ter impact, and assume at each small time interval, there is only a small proportion of creditors
whose contracts expire and need to be rolled over. In this paper, we try to include both impacts.
The former impact is modeled in a similar way to Morris and Shin (2010) and Liang et al. (2014)
by assuming the representative creditor’s belief exogenously. However, we take a more general
model in the sense that the representative creditor’s belief is a general random variable, and
we also compare the results with different assumptions on the distribution of such a random
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variable. The latter impact is included by considering the dynamic programming equation of the
representative creditor, which is in the same spirit as He and Xiong (2012b).
Finally, our fourth contribution is to answer the question whether the representative short-
term creditor’s rollover decision is indeed optimal. This question also arises in the existing
dynamic debt run models such as those in Morris and Shin (2010), He and Xiong (2012b), and
Liang et al. (2014), but has so far not been answered. In both the discrete and the staggered
tenor structures, we show that the decision problem of the representative short-term creditor is
equivalent to a non-standard optimal stopping time problem with control constraints. At each
rollover date the representative creditor faces the risk that the firm may fail due to a debt run
based on her belief. If the firm survives, the creditor can then decide whether to withdraw her
funding (stop) or to roll over her contract (continue). If the firm fails due to other creditors’ runs,
the representative creditor is then forced to stop and faces the recovery risk from bankruptcy.
Therefore, the decision time for the representative creditor must exclude the default time due to
debt runs. For the case of the staggered tenor structure, since the maturity dates are the arrival
times of a Cox process, the representative creditor is only allowed to stop (i.e., to withdraw her
funding) at a sequence of Cox arrival times rather than at any stopping time. In the literature,
such kind of optimal stopping at Poisson-type arrival times has been used to solve the standard
optimal stopping time problem by Krylov (2008) as the so-called randomized stopping time tech-
nique.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions on the firm’s cap-
ital structure and explains the rollover decision of a representative short-term creditor in the
benchmark model. We also present the rigorous formulation of the rollover decision problem
in terms of dynamic programming equations. In section 3 we use the creditor’s value function
derived in the dynamic programming equations to determine the short-term creditor’s debt run
barrier as well as the firm’s illiquidity barrier in case of both the discrete and the staggered debt
structures. We reformulate the creditor’s decision problem in terms of the associated optimal
stochastic control problem in section 4. Section 5 discusses the related literature and concludes.
2 Benchmark Debt Run Model
In this section, we propose a debt run model that incorporates rollover risk into the structural
credit risk framework.
2.1 Capital Structure of a Firm
Consider a market defined over a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P), which supports a stan-
dard Brownian motion (Wt)t≥0 with its natural filtration {Ft} after augmentation. The market
interest rate r is assumed to be constant. In this market, consider a firm whose fundamental
value of assets follows
dVt
Vt
= rV dt+ σdWt,
with constant volatility σ > 0. The constant rV denotes the expected return on the firm’s risky
assets. We assume that the firm fundamental is publicly observable.
The firm finances its asset holdings in the duration [0, T ] by issuing short-term debt, such as
asset-backed commercial papers and overnight repos, long-term debt such as corporate bonds, and
equities and others. At initiation time T0 = 0 an amount L0 is borrowed long-term at rate rL until
fixed maturity T > 0. Moreover, an amount S0 is borrowed short-term at rate rS until maturity
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T1. When short-term debt matures it can be successively rolled over until the next rollover date.
This produces a sequence of maturity dates (or rollover dates) 0 = T0 < T1 < T2 · · · < T∞ =∞
for short-term debt. For the moment, we do not impose any structural conditions on the short-
term debt maturities {Tn}n≥1. They could be either deterministic or random.
If there is no default, the value of short-term debt follows
dSt = rSStdt,
and the value of long-term debt follows
dLt = rLLtdt.
The ratio of long-term debt over short-term debt Lt/St is denoted by lt and follows
dlt = (rL − rS)ltdt.
Moreover, we introduce a process Xt as the ratio of the firm’s asset value over the short-term
debt value Xt = Vt/St. Hence, Xt follows
dXt
Xt
= (rV − rS)dt+ σdWt.
Short-term creditors have the opportunity to withdraw their funding at the rollover dates.
When the firm is under financial distress or when an outside investment opportunity is more
attractive they will make use of this option. Long-term creditors, however, are locked in once
they lend money to the firm. They are exposed to a higher risk, and therefore, should be rewarded
with a higher interest rate. Moreover, since creditors are exposed to the firm’s default risk, a risk
premium should be paid on top of the market interest rate. We have the following assumption
on different interest rates2.
Assumption 2.1 The long-term interest rate rL is strictly greater than the short-term interest
rate rS, while the latter is strictly greater than the market interest rate r, i.e., we assume rL >
rS > r.
2.2 The Rollover Decision of a Representative Short-Term Creditor
Short-term creditors choose whether to renew their maturing contracts, that is, they need
to decide whether to roll over or to withdraw their funding (i.e., to run) at the maturity times.
Hence, they face a dynamic coordination problem.
Consider the decision problem of a representative short-term creditor. The first key fac-
tor to determine the representative short-term creditor’s rollover decision is the insolvency risk
stemming from the deterioration of the firm fundamental. To include this factor, we follow
the classic first-passage-time framework (see for example Black and Cox (1976)) by assuming an
exogenously given insolvency barrier
DInst = Stβ(lt),
where β : (0,∞) → (0,∞) is a safety covenant function of the ratio lt = Lt/St. As long as the
asset value Vt at any time t is greater than or equal to the total value of debt St + Lt, the firm
can be considered solvent. Hence, it is natural to assume that
β(lt) ≤ (1 + lt) (2.1)
2The assumption of constant interest rates is imposed to simplify derivations. In reality, different rates not
only vary in time, but also move differently, motivating the so called multi-curve modeling (see for example
Cre´py et al (2012)).
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such that
DInst = Stβ(lt) ≤ St(1 + lt) = St + Lt.
The bankruptcy time due to insolvency is then given by the following first-passage-time
τIns = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vt ≤ D
Ins
t } = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ β(lt)}.
To coordinate with other creditors, the representative creditor needs to take other creditors’
rollover decisions into account, and makes her own decision based on whether the firm will survive
debt runs or not at each rollover date Tn. Assume that the creditor believes that the proportion
of short-term creditors not rolling over their funding at each rollover date Tn is a random variable
ξ supported on [0, 1] with its conditional density f(·|XTn) given XTn .
The firm will survive debt runs if it can raise enough funding to pay off its creditors who run
on the firm and still keep solvent. In case of a debt run the firm has to issue collateralized debt
by pledging its assets as collateral to raise the liquidity. The actual value of the collateral does
not matter. It is the maximum value of the collateral that determines whether the firm is still
liquid or not. The maximum collateral value of the assets is expressed in terms of the fire-sale
price ψVTn with the fire-sale rate ψ ∈ (0, 1)
3. If ψVTn ≥ ξSTn , the firm is able to pay off its
creditors who run on the firm, so a potential debt run at time Tn would not lead to a default.
Hence, the second key factor determining the creditor’s rollover decision is her belief about the
probability that the firm survives the debt run at the rollover date Tn, which equals
θ(XTn) = P (ψVTn ≥ ξSTn |XTn)
= P (ψXTn ≥ ξ|XTn)
= P (0 ≤ ξ ≤ min{1, ψXTn}|XTn) =
∫ min{1,ψXTn}
0
f(x|XTn)dx (2.2)
conditional on the firm being solvent at Tn, i.e. on the event {VTn ≥ D
Ins
Tn
}. In both Morris and Shin
(2010) and Liang et al. (2014), the random variable ξ is simply assumed to be uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1], so that f(·|XTn) = 1 and
θ(XTn) = min{1, ψXTn}.
This assumption is justified by global games theory as it has been shown in Morris and Shin
(2003) that this is a limiting case of the situation with unobservable firm fundamental when the
variance of the noise term tends to zero. In section 3.2, we will show that the uniform distribution
assumption is relatively robust by comparing it to a family of truncated normal distributions
with the same mean but different variances.
The third key factor for the representative short-term creditor’s rollover decision is the re-
covery rate when the firm defaults either due to debt runs or due to insolvency. If the firm
defaults at some time t ∈ [0, T ], the firm is exposed to certain bankruptcy costs. Suppose these
are proportional to the firm fundamental value, and for α ∈ (0, 1), αVt is the firm value after
having paid the bankruptcy costs. Then, the value αVt will be divided among all the creditors,
so the representative short-term creditor obtains the proportion of her funding and she gets at
most her debt value back. Thus, we define the recovery rate as
Rt = min
{
1,
αVt
St + Lt
}
= min
{
1,
αXt
1 + lt
}
. (2.3)
3The constant ψ is the fire-sale rate of the firm fundamental when the firm is in a distressed state, i.e., it
represents the amount that can be borrowed by pledging one unit of the risky assets as collateral. For a detailed
discussion of how to endogenously determine the fire-sale rate by the leverage of the firm, we refer to Liang et al.
(2014).
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Note that in case of a default due to a debt run, it can happen that the asset value is larger
than St+Lt. Therefore, we have to cut off the recovery rate by 1. However, if the firm defaults due
to insolvency at the first-passage-time τIns, the asset value by definition equals the insolvency
barrier DIns
τIns
. In this case the recovery rate equals
RτIns =
αDIns
τIns
SτIns + LτIns
=
αβ(lτIns)
1 + lτIns
which is less than 1 by condition (2.1).
We assume that rollover decisions are solely determined by the aforementioned factors, which
we summarize as follows.
Assumption 2.2 The following three factors determine the rollover decision of a representative
short-term creditor.
(i) Insolvency risk is reflected by the first-passage-time τIns when the firm’s asset value falls
below the insolvency barrier DInst .
(ii) Rollover risk is reflected by the representative short-term creditor’s belief on the probability
θ(XTn) that the firm survives the debt run at the rollover date Tn.
(iii) Recovery risk is reflected by the fraction Rt of funding that the representative short-term
creditor obtains in case of a default at time t.
We further impose the following condition on the safety covenant function for technical con-
venience.
Assumption 2.3 The safety covenant function β(lt) in the definition of the insolvency barrier
DInst has the linear form β(lt) = βlt for some positive constant β ≤ (1/lt + 1).
2.3 Dynamic Programming Equations
In this section we derive dynamic programming equations for the short-term creditor’s rollover
decision problem. We consider a representative short-term creditor who invests an amount nor-
malized to 1 monetary unit at time t ∈ [0, T ]. Her discounted expected return over the remaining
time period [t, T ] is described by the value function U(t, x) given the current ratio Xt = x of
asset value over short-term debt value, and she discounts at the market rate r. To investigate
the creditor’s value function we go backwards in time starting with her last rollover date prior
to terminal time T . Suppose that her N th rollover date is the closest one prior to the maturity
T of long-term debt, that is, TN < T and TN+1 ≥ T . Figure 1 illustrates the maturities of the
short- and long-term debt. If the maturities are random (as in section 3.2), then what we do in
the following is to condition on one realization of {Tn(ω)}n≥1 so that TN (ω) < T ≤ TN+1(ω).
By abuse of notation, we continue to write Tn for Tn(ω) in such a case.
Figure 1: Maturities of Short- and Long-Term Debt
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At the terminal time T , the representative short-term creditor faces the insolvency risk that
the firm may not pay back her funding, and her value function at the terminal time is4
U(T, x) = RT = min
{
1,
x
1 + lT
}
, (2.4)
which represents the insolvency risk stemming from the final workout of the firm fundamental
as in Merton (1974).
During the last time period (TN , T ), all of the creditors are locked in, so there is no rollover
risk, and the representative short-term creditor only faces the insolvency risk with the associated
recovery risk. Her value function for t ∈ (TN , T ) is
U(t, x) = Ext
{
1{t≤τIns<T}e
−r(τIns−t) · erS(τ
Ins−t)RτIns
+ 1{τIns≥T}e
−r(T−t) · erS(T−t)U(T,XT )
}
, (2.5)
where the first term in the bracket captures the insolvency risk from the firm fundamental falling
below the insolvency barrierDInst during the time period (t, T ), and the second term captures the
insolvency risk from the final workout of the firm’s risky project at time T . Hence, (2.5) represents
the insolvency risk due to the deterioration of the firm fundamental as in Black and Cox (1976).
To determine the value function at t = TN we take a closer look at the rollover decision
problem. At the rollover date TN , if the firm survives a debt run, the representative short-
term creditor will compare the expected return from rolling over her funding with the expected
market return, and will choose whatever results in a higher return for her. If the firm defaults
due to a debt run, she will receive the recovery value RTN in any case, regardless of whether she
decides to roll over her funding or not. Hence, the creditor can only make her rollover decision
conditional on the firm surviving the current debt run. Therefore, the value function given in
equation (2.5) also describes her discounted expected return at time t = TN for the remaining
time period (TN , T ).
In general, during the time period [Tn, Tn+1) for n = 0, 1, . . . , N−1, the representative short-
term creditor is exposed not only to the insolvency risk arising from the deterioration of the
firm fundamental in the period [Tn, Tn+1) but also to the rollover risk caused by other creditors’
rollover decisions at time Tn+1. Table 1 summarizes her payoff at maturity Tn+1.
Table 1: Representative creditor’s aggregate payoff from Tn to Tn+1
Decision Solvency in [Tn, Tn+1], Solvency in [Tn, Tn+1], Insolvency in [Tn, Tn+1].
at Tn+1 no default due to run at Tn+1. default due to run at Tn+1.
Run erS(Tn+1−Tn) · 1 erS(Tn+1−Tn) · RTn+1 e
rS(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns
Rollover erS(Tn+1−Tn) · U(Tn+1, XTn+1) e
rS(Tn+1−Tn) · RTn+1 e
rS(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns
At maturity Tn+1 if there is no default, the representative short-term creditor either withdraws
her funding to get erS(Tn+1−Tn) ·1 or renews her contract to receive erS(Tn+1−Tn) ·U(Tn+1, XTn+1).
If the firm defaults due to a debt run at time Tn+1, the creditor just gets the fraction RTn+1 of
4The probability of the insolvency time τIns equal to the terminal time T is zero, so at the terminal time T
the firm only faces the insolvency risk stemming from the final workout of the firm’s risky project. For this reason
the recovery rate R at time T is redefined as RT = min{1, XT /(1 + lT )}.
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her funding erS(Tn+1−Tn) back. Since the creditor believes that the firm survives a debt run at
time Tn+1 with probability θ(XTn+1), her discounted expected return at time t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1) can
be described by the following value function
U(t, x) = Ext
{
1{t≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns + 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−t)·
·
[
θ(XTn+1)max
{
1, U(Tn+1, XTn+1)
}
+ (1− θ(XTn+1))RTn+1
]}
. (2.6)
The first term on the right hand side captures the insolvency risk within the time period [t, Tn+1),
whereas the second term captures the rollover risk at time Tn+1 as well as the insolvency and
rollover risks in [Tn+1, T ]. Therefore, the first term in the second line of (2.6) represents the
future rollover risk (and insolvency risk) as in He and Xiong (2012b), and the second term in the
second line of (2.6) represents the current rollover risk as in Morris and Shin (2010). Note that
if the maturities are random, then both (2.5) and (2.6) are understood as conditioning on one
realization of {Tn(ω)}n≥1 so that TN < T ≤ TN+1.
The dynamic programming equations (2.5) and (2.6) for the value function U(t, x) are the
drivers to determine the debt run barrier in our model, which will be discussed later. By the
Feynman-Kac formula, we have the following partial differential equation (PDE) representation
for the value function U(t, x).
Proposition 2.1 Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are satisfied. For n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
let Wn(t, x) be the unique solution to the following PDE Dirichlet problem on [Tn, Tn+1]×[βlt,∞)

∂Wn
∂t
+ LWn + (rS − r)Wn = 0
Wn(t, βlt) = αβlt/(1 + lt)
Wn(Tn+1, x) = θ(x)max {1,Wn+1(Tn+1, x)}+ (1− θ(x))αx/(1 + lTn+1).
(2.7)
For n = N , let WN (t, x) be the unique solution to the following Dirichlet problem on [TN , T ]×
[βlt,∞) 

∂WN
∂t
+ LWN + (rS − r)WN = 0
WN (t, βlt) = αβlt/(1 + lt)
WN (T, x) = min {1, x/(1 + lT )} ,
(2.8)
where L is the infinitesimal generator for the ratio process X given by
L =
1
2
σ2x2
∂2
∂x2
+ (rV − rS)x
∂
∂x
.
Then the value function U(t, x) is given by concatenating Wn(t, x) together
U(t, x) =Wn(t, x) for t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1).
Based on the Green’s function technique, we further have the following analytical represen-
tation for the value function U(t, x¯) where x¯ = x/(βlt).
Proposition 2.2 (Green’s Representation) For n = 0, 1, . . . , N , denote Pn and Φn respectively
as the boundary condition and the terminal condition of the corresponding PDE for the value
function U(t, x¯) on [Tn, Tn+1), where TN+1 := T for convenience. Then
U(t, x¯) =
∫ ∞
1
Pn(ξ)G(t, x¯;Tn+1, ξ)dξ +
1
2
σ2
∫ Tn+1
t
Φn(η)
∂
∂ξ
{
ξ2G(t, x¯; η, ξ)
}∣∣
ξ=1
dη (2.9)
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on [Tn, Tn+1), where G(t, x¯; η, ξ) is the Green’s function for the operator L
v defined as
Lv =
∂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2x¯2
∂2
∂x¯2
+ (rV − rL)x¯
∂
∂x¯
+ (rS − r)
on the domain [Tn, Tn+1]× [1,∞) given by
G(t, x¯;Tn+1, ξ) =
e(rS−r)(Tn+1−t)
ξσ
√
2pi(Tn+1 − t)
exp

−
[
log x¯
ξ
+ (rV − rL −
1
2σ
2)(Tn+1 − t)
]2
2σ2(Tn+1 − t)


×
[
1− exp
{
2 log 1
ξ
log x¯
σ2(Tn+1 − t)
}]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3 Threshold Strategies of Debt Run Model
In this section, we use the dynamic programming equations (2.5) and (2.6) to determine the
debt run barrier as well as the illiquidity barrier for the representative short-term creditor. Our
main objective is to show the monotonic relationship among the debt run barrier, the illiquidity
barrier, and the exogenously given insolvency barrier.
3.1 Discrete Tenor Structure: Revisit of Liang et al. (2014)
In this subsection, we extend the main results in Liang et al. (2014) to our general setup.
Liang et al. (2014) show that there exists a threshold, called the debt run barrier such that the
representative short-term creditor will withdraw her funding whenever the firm fundamental falls
below this barrier at a rollover date. The debt run barrier is only a finite sequence of numbers,
since the creditor only has a finite number of rollover dates to decide whether to run or not. In
our general setting we define the debt run barrier DRunTn for any n = 0, 1, . . . , N as the critical
asset value such that the representative short-term creditor is indifferent in terms of running or
rolling over her debt, i.e., it is defined via the unique value x∗Tn such that 1 = U(Tn, x
∗
Tn
) in
the maximum term in dynamic programming equation (2.6). The debt run barrier DRunTn is then
determined by
DRunTn = x
∗
Tn
STn = x
∗
Tn
S0e
rSTn , for n = 0, 1, . . . , N.
Since such a debt run barrier is determined by the representative short-term creditor, it is actually
the debt run barrier for all of the short-term creditors, who will then run on the firm if VTn ≤
DRunTn . Although the representative creditor (so every short-term creditor) holds the belief that
ξ proportion of them will run on the firm at each date Tn, they will actually run at the same
time based on such a debt run barrier strategy. In fact, such kind of debt run barrier strategy
also appears in dynamic debt run models such as Morris and Shin (2010), He and Xiong (2012b)
and Liang et al. (2014).
In the following, we show that such a debt run barrier always dominates the insolvency
barrier. Note that the value function U(t, x) is obviously increasing with respect to x, and when
the firm goes bankrupt due to insolvency at a rollover date Tn = τ
Ins, the value function is
U(Tn, βlTn) = RTn = αβlTn/(1 + lTn).
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Due to Assumption 2.3 we have β ≤ (1/lTn + 1) so that U(Tn, βlTn) ≤ 1 = U(Tn, x
∗
Tn
). Hence
we have βlTn ≤ x
∗
Tn
. This means the insolvency barrier DInst at any rollover date t = Tn is
dominated by the debt run barrier, i.e., DInsTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
for n = 0, 1, . . . , N. Note that this domi-
nance always holds in Liang et al. (2014), since the recovery rate Rt is assumed to be zero therein.
A debt run does not necessarily trigger a default, for example in the case where the firm can
raise enough funding to pay off its maturing short-term debt. The firm will survive the debt run
at the rollover date Tn, if ψVTn ≥ STn conditional on VTn ≥ D
Ins
Tn
. Motivated by this observation
we introduce a third barrier, which we call an illiquidity barrier DIll, and which is defined as
follows
DIllTn = min
{
DRunTn ,max{STn/ψ,D
Ins
Tn
}
}
, for n = 0, 1, . . . , N. (3.1)
Hence, an illiquidity default only occurs if there is a debt run and the firm is not able to raise
enough funds to pay off its maturing short-term debt or not able to remain solvent at the debt
run.
In the following, we show that the insolvency barrier DInst at t = Tn is also dominated by
the illiquidity barrier, i.e., DInsTn ≤ D
Ill
Tn
for n = 0, 1, . . . , N. Indeed, we always have
DIllTn ≥ min{D
Run
Tn
, DInsTn } = D
Ins
Tn
.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are satisfied. Then at any maturity
Tn, the debt run barrier is no less than the illiquidity barrier, while the latter is no less than the
insolvency barrier, i.e.,
DInsTn ≤ D
Ill
Tn
≤ DRunTn for n = 0, 1, . . . , N.
Due to this relationship, the debt run barrier, the illiquidity barrier and the insolvency barrier
determine four possible scenarios at each of the rollover dates Tn which are illustrated in the
flowchart in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Figure 3 shows different scenarios in our debt run model with the discrete tenor structure
for three simulated asset value paths. Here we assume ξ is uniformly distributed, and N = 4
rollover dates at times t = 2, 4, 6, and 8. The dotted line shows the debt run barrier, the dashed
line the illiquidity barrier, and the solid line the insolvency barrier. Note that in this discrete
setting, the debt run barrier and the illiquidity barrier are not continuous functions. They consist
only of the marked points. The black asset value path falls below the insolvency barrier shortly
before time t = 4. At the rollover date t = 2 prior to this time, the asset value is larger than
the debt run barrier. Hence, in this simulation the firm will default shortly before time t = 4
due to insolvency. The dark black path falls below the illiquidity barrier at the third rollover
date at time t = 6,and before time t = 6 it always stays above the insolvency barrier. Thus, in
this simulation the firm defaults due to illiquidity at time t = 6. Finally, the grey path shows
a scenario where a debt run occurs at the last rollover date t = 8. At that time, however, the
asset value is still larger than the illiquidity barrier, meaning that the firm is able to raise enough
funds to pay off its short-term creditors. Hence, the firm survives the debt run.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
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3.2 Staggered Tenor Structure
In Liang et al. (2014) it is assumed that short-term debt rollover dates are given by a de-
terministic sequence of numbers and that they are the same for all short-term creditors. This
assumption is rather restrictive. The firm is highly exposed to rollover risk in such a setting
where all short-term funding expires at the same date. In practice, however, firms tend to spread
out their debt expirations across time to reduce their exposure to liquidity risk. In this section,
we introduce a more flexible debt maturity structure. Among others, Leland (1994, 1998) and
Leland and Toft (1996) introduced the so-called staggered maturity structure to capture this fact.
The idea is to use the arrival times of a Poisson process to model the maturities of short-term
debt. In other words, the duration of short-term debt T1 − T0, T2 − T1, . . . has an exponential
distribution. While the random duration assumption appears different from the standard debt
contract with a predetermined maturity, it captures the staggered debt maturity structure of a
typical firm. For the application of such a Poisson maturity structure in the literature of debt
runs, we refer to the recent work by He and Xiong (2012b).
The crucial parameter under the aforementioned Poisson maturity structure framework is
the intensity λ. Its inverse 1/λ can be interpreted as the average duration of short-term debt.
We consider a Cox maturity structure, meaning that the maturity of short-term debt follows a
more general and flexible Cox process. Recall that a Cox process is a generalization of Poisson
processes in which the intensity is allowed to be random but in such a way that if we condition
on a particular realization λt(ω) of the intensity, the process becomes an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with intensity λt(ω). The economic intuition of using the Cox maturity structure is that
the average duration of the short-term debt that the firm issues should depend on some time-
dependent economic factors such as the firm fundamental V , the ratio X of the firm fundamental
over the short-term debt, or even some underlying states of the economy. In the following we
therefore assume that the average maturity is a function of the ratio process X .
We construct the short-term debt maturities {Tn}n≥1 by so-called canonical construction.
Let {En}n≥1 be a sequence of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random
variables on some complete probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜), and define the enlarged probability space
by
Ω¯ = Ω× Ω˜, G¯ = F ⊗ F˜ , and Q = P⊗ P˜.
We assume the intensity has the form λt = g(Xt), where g : (0,∞)→ (0,∞) is a smooth function
with compact support. Then the maturities of short-term debt are constructed recursively as
T0 = 0 and Tn = inf
{
t ≥ Tn−1 :
∫ t
Tn−1
g(Xs)ds ≥ En
}
, forn ≥ 1.
We summarize the above construction in the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1 (Cox maturity structure) The maturities of the short-term debt {Tn}n≥1 are
the arrival times of a Cox process with intensity g(Xt).
Under the Cox maturity structure, we still employ the representative short-term creditor’s
dynamic programming equations (2.5) and (2.6) to determine her value function U(t, x). Letting
the ratio process start from Xt = x and the short-term debt maturities start from T0 = t, we
synthesize the dynamic programming equations (2.5) and (2.6) into the following succinct form
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on the event {T1 > t}:
U(t, x)
= Ext
{
1{t≤τIns<T}
[
1{t<T1<τIns}e
(rS−r)(T1−t) [θ(XT1)max {1, U(T1, XT1)}+ (1− θ(XT1))RT1 ]
+1{T1≥τIns}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns
]
+ 1{τIns≥T}
[
1{t<T1<T}e
(rS−r)(T1−t) [θ(XT1)max {1, U(T1, XT1)}+ (1− θ(XT1))RT1 ]
+1{T1≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)min {1, XT /(1 + lT )}
]}
. (3.2)
By using the distribution of the first arrival time T1, and applying the Feynman-Kac formula,
we derive the following PDE representation for the value function U(t, x) under the Cox maturity
structure.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 are satisfied. Then the value
function U(t, x) satisfies the following semi-linear PDE Dirichlet problem on [0, T ]× [βlt,∞):

∂U
∂t
+ LU + (rS − r − g(x))U
+g(x)[θ(x)max{1, U}+ (1− θ(x))αx/(1 + lt)] = 0
U(t, βlt) = αβlt/(1 + lt)
U(T, x) = min {1, x/(1 + lT )} .
(3.3)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In Appendix B, we provide a numerical algorithm to approximate the solution of the above
PDE (3.3). In the rest of this section, we show that PDE (3.3) implies a unique threshold for the
representative short-term creditor, i.e., there exists a unique debt run barrier DRunt such that
she will run on the firm whenever both the firm’s asset value falls below such a barrier and her
contract expires at some maturity Tn. Thus, the debt run time in our model is characterized
endogenously by the following first-passage-time
τRun = inf{Tn : XTn ≤ x
∗(Tn)} ∧ T,
where x∗(t) is the threshold we shall derive in the remainder of this section. Recall that Xt =
Vt/St is the ratio of the firm fundamental over the short-term debt, so the debt run barrier D
Run
t
is given as
DRunt = x
∗(t)St = x
∗(t)S0e
rSt.
We derive a free-boundary problem to determine first the threshold x∗(t) and secondly the
debt run barrier DRunt based on the semi-linear PDE (3.3).
(i) If x > x∗(t), the representative short-term creditor will keep lending her money to the firm
because either the debt is not due yet or if the debt is due she decides to roll over her
funding. Her value function U(t, x) > 1, and (3.3) reduces to
∂U
∂t
+ LU + (rS − r − g(x))U + g(x)θ(x)U + g(x)(1 − θ(x))αx/(1 + lt) = 0. (3.4)
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The third term in the above equation represents the creditor’s premium of the return, the
fourth term represents the expected effect of the rollover risk if the creditor rolls over her
funding, and the last term represents the expected effect of recovery risk associated with a
potential debt run.
(ii) If x < x∗(t), the representative short-term creditor will run on the firm if the debt is due.
Her value function U(t, x) < 1, and (3.3) reduces to
∂U
∂t
+ LU + (rS − r − g(x))U + g(x)θ(x) + g(x)(1− θ(x))αx/(1 + lt) = 0. (3.5)
While the third term and the last term in (3.5) have the same meanings as those in (3.4), the
fourth term captures the expected effect of rollover risk from the representative short-term
creditor’s own run.
(iii) Finally, by the continuity of U(t, x), the creditor’s value function U(t, x) at the threshold
x∗(t) should be equal to 1, and the following smooth-pasting condition should be satisfied
Ux+0(t, x
∗(t)) = Ux−0(t, x
∗(t)).
In summary, we obtain the following two-phase free-boundary problem to determine the
threshold (i.e., the debt run barrier) of the representative short-term creditor (so every short-
term creditor).
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 are satisfied. Then the debt
run barrier DRunt is given by
DRunt = x
∗(t)S0e
rSt,
where x∗(t) is the free-boundary of the following two-phase free-boundary problem

∂U
∂t
+ LU + (rS − r − g(x))U + g(x)θ(x)U + g(x)(1 − θ(x))αx/(1 + lt) = 0, for x > x
∗(t),
U(t, x) > 1, for x > x∗(t),
U(t, x) = 1, for x = x∗(t),
Ux(t, x) is continuous, for x = x
∗(t),
∂U
∂t
+ LU + (rS − r − g(x))U + g(x)θ(x) + g(x)(1− θ(x))αx/(1 + lt) = 0, for βlt < x < x
∗(t),
U(t, x) < 1, for βlt < x < x
∗(t),
U(t, x) = αβlt/(1 + lt), for x = βlt,
U(T, x) = min{1, x/(1 + lT )}.
(3.6)
Proof. We only need to prove the smooth-pasting condition, which is straightforward since
PDE (3.3) admits a unique classical solution.
Similar to the case of the discrete tenor structure in section 3.1, a debt run does not necessarily
trigger the firm’s default. The firm will not default due to a debt run if the firm can raise enough
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funding to pay off its short-term creditors who run on the firm, and remain solvent at the debt
run, i.e., if ψVTn ≥ STn conditional on VTn ≥ D
Ins
Tn
. Therefore, we define the firm’s illiquidity
barrier as
DIllt = min
{
DRunt ,max{St/ψ,D
Ins
t }
}
for t ∈ [0, T ).
However, such a barrier only acts at a sequence of Cox arrival times {Tn}n≥1. At each in-
finitesimal time interval [t, t+ dt] with probability g(Xt)dt, the short-term debt matures, and an
illiquidity default will happen if Vt ≤ D
Ill
t . With probability 1 − g(Xt)dt, the short-term debt
does not mature yet, so all of the short-term creditors are locked in, and an illiquidity default
will not occur even if Vt ≤ D
Ill
T . We have a similar relationship among the barriers as in the case
of the discrete tenor structure.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 are satisfied. Then at any time
t ∈ [0, T ), the debt run barrier is greater than or equal to the illiquidity barrier, while the latter
is greater than or equal to the insolvency barrier
DInst ≤ D
Ill
t ≤ D
Run
t for t ∈ [0, T ).
The above relationship gives us the following four possible scenarios at any rollover date Tn.
(i) VTn ≤ D
Ins
Tn
: Default due to insolvency;
(ii) DInsTn < VTn ≤ D
Ill
Tn
: Debt run occurs and triggers a default due to illiquidity;
(iii) DIllTn < VTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
: Debt run occurs, but no default caused by the run;
(iv) DRunTn < VTn : The creditor rolls over to the next maturity Tn+1.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Theorem 3.1, so we omit it.
Figure 4 illustrates different scenarios in our debt run model with the staggered tenor structure
of short-term debt and the uniform distribution on the proportion of short-term creditors not
rolling over their funding at each rollover date. Here the intensity of the Cox process is chosen
to be g(x) = 0.4. The dotted line shows the debt run barrier, the dashed line the illiquidity
barrier and the solid line the insolvency barrier, all of which are continuous functions in this
model setting. The marked times T1, T2, and T3 are one realization of the arrival times of the
Cox process, which are smaller than the final date T = 10. At the first rollover date T1 all
three asset value paths are above the debt run barrier. Hence, all of the creditors roll over their
contracts. The black asset value path is above all of the three barriers at T2, but falls below
the insolvency barrier before the third rollover date T3. Hence, the firm will default at that
time point before T3. At the second rollover date T2, the grey path falls below the debt run
barrier but is still above the illiquidity barrier. This means that a debt run occurs at that date,
but the firm is able to pay off its creditors and survives. At the last rollover date T3 the dark
black path is below the illiquidity barrier, which means that a debt run occurs and the debt run
actually triggers an illiquidity default. Note that all three paths fall below the debt run and the
illiquidity barriers already much earlier in time. However, as these times are not rollover dates
for the representative short-term creditor, she cannot withdraw her funding at these dates.
The figure also illustrates the relation between different barriers, which has been theoretically
proved in Theorem 3.4; the debt run barrier is always greater than or equal to the illiquidity
barrier, which in turn is always greater than or equal to the insolvency barrier.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
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Finally, we show in Figure 5 the debt run barrier DRunt with different assumptions on the
random variable ξ, the representative short-term creditor’s belief on the proportion of short-
term creditors not rolling over their funding. The top line shows the debt run barrier when ξ is
uniformly distributed : f(·|XTn) = 1. From the next top line to the bottom line, they correspond
to the debt run barrier with ξ following normal distribution truncated on [0, 1] with mean µ = 0.5
and variance σ2 = 1, 1/3, 1/6, 1/12 on Tn. That is, ξ has the conditional density
f(x|XTn) = f(x) =
1
σ
φ(x−µ
σ
)
Φ(1−µ
σ
)− Φ(−µ
σ
)
,
where φ and Φ are the density function and the cumulative distribution function of a normal
random variable N(µ, σ2) respectively. The top line and the bottom line have the same mean 0.5
and the same variance 1/12, which illustrates that the uniform distribution assumption is more
conservative for the creditors compared to the normal distribution assumption. On the other
hand, for the normally distributed ξ with the same mean, the larger the variance is, the higher
the debt run barrier.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
3.3 Comparison of the Discrete and the Staggered Tenor Structures
This section compares different debt tenor structures, i.e., the discrete and the staggered
tenor structures. We first calculate the survival probabilities under both tenor structures. For
the calculation of the survival probability under the discrete tenor structure setting, we refer
to Liang et al. (2014). The calculation of the survival probability under the staggered tenor
structure is tricky, as the number of Cox arrival times happening during the time interval [0, T ]
is random. Inspired by the recursive formula (3.2) for the calculation of the value function,
we also calculate the survival probability in a recursive way. Let P (t, x) be the corresponding
survival probability at time t given the current ratio Xt = x. Then on the event {T1 > t},
P (t, x) = Ext
{
1{t≤τIns<T}
[
1{t<T1<τIns}1{XT1≥xIll(T1)}P (T1, XT1)
]
+ 1{τIns≥T}
[
1{t<T1<T}1{XT1≥xIll(T1)}P (T1, XT1) + 1{T1≥T}
]}
,
where xIll(T1) = D
Ill
T1
/ST1 = min{x
∗(T1),max{1/ψ, βlT1}}. By Lemma A.1, the survival proba-
bility P (t, x) can be calculated as
P (t, x) = Ext
{∫ τIns∧T
t
e−
∫ s
t
g(Xu)dug(Xs)
[
1{Xs≥xIll(s)}P (s,Xs)
]
ds
+ 1{τIns≥T}e
−
∫
T
t
g(Xu)du
}
.
Therefore, the Feynman-Kac formula gives the following semilinear PDE representation for
the survival probability P (t, x):

∂P
∂t
+ LP − g(x)P + g(x)
[
1{x≥xIll(t)}P
]
= 0
P (t, βlt) = 0
P (T, x) = 1.
(3.7)
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Its solution can be numerically approximated in a similar way to the numerical approximation
for (3.3) in Appendix B. Given the survival probability P (t, x), the default probability can then
be calculated as 1− P (t, x).
In Figure 6 we show the default probabilities under both the discrete and the staggered tenor
structures with uniformly distributed ξ. The dashed-dotted line is the default probability with-
out taking rollover risk into account, which corresponds to the default probability in the setting
of Black and Cox (1976). Hence, the areas between the dashed-dotted line and the other two
lines represent the rollover risks induced by debt runs under the staggered tenor structure and
under the discrete tenor structure, resp. The results show that the default probability is increas-
ing with increasing volatility as the asset value becomes more risky. Furthermore, the figure
supports the intuition that replacing the discrete tenor structure by a staggered tenor structure
reduces liquidity risk.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
In Figures 6(a) and 6(b) we see a kink in the default probability for the staggered tenor struc-
ture. This kink is less noticeable in Figures 6(c) and 6(d) and does not appear in the discrete
tenor structure case. This indicates that this feature is due to the different specifications in the
intensity function g(x) of the Cox process and the volatility σ of the firm fundamental. For
very low asset values τIns < T1 with high probability, the insolvency component determines the
profile of the default probability in the staggered tenor structure case. For higher asset values T1
can be smaller than τIns. In this case there exists a critical asset value such that creditors will
very likely decide to withdraw when the asset value is below this level and a run will most likely
induce an illiquidity default. This implies an almost flat default probability for asset values below
this critical level. For higher asset values a debt run does not necessarily imply an illiquidity
default and thus the default probability is monotonically decreasing for increasing asset value.
The same feature is noticeable in Figure 7(a) which we will discuss below.
[Insert Figure 7 here.]
When creditors fear that the firm will be unable to repay their debt, they will withdraw their
funding simultaneously at a rollover date and thereby, they might trigger an illiquidity induced
default. The key quantity in our model that determines the creditors’ behavior is their beliefs
on the survival probability of the debt run θ. When θ is close to one, creditors are optimistic to
get paid off. This is the case when either the firm’s asset value and the fire-sale rate are high
or when the short-term debt notional is very low. Figure 7 shows that the illiquidity component
of the default probability dramatically increases when fire-sale rate decreases. Thus, creditors’
might withdraw their funding because they have a very pessimistic view on the firm’s ability
to repay them (low fire-sale rate induces low θ) although the firm’s asset value might be well
above the insolvency barrier. This supports the idea that debt runs can occur as a result of pure
coordination failures where θ can be interpreted as a coordination parameter.5
A natural question to ask is, what will happen with the discrete tenor structure when the
number of rollover dates increases to infinity, meaning that creditors can decide to roll over or to
withdraw their funding at any time t ∈ [0, T ]? Intuitively, one would expect that with increasing
rollover frequency, one should approximate the staggered tenor structure model. However, there
5Arifovic et al. (2013) study how coordination problems can affect the occurrence of bank runs in controlled
laboratory environments.
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is another important difference between the two debt tenor structures. In the case of the discrete
tenor structure we implicitly assume that all creditors have the same rollover dates, whereas in
the staggered tenor structure model at each rollover date, corresponding to a Cox arrival time,
only a fraction of total debt is due. Different short-term creditors hence have different rollover
dates in that situation.
In the following, we will first study the impact of the intensity λt = g(Xt) of the Cox process
on the creditor’s value function. We assume the function g(Xt) to be constant and thus indepen-
dent of the ratio process Xt. The intensity of the Cox process not only specifies the creditor’s
rollover dates but also affects the average duration of short-term debt. For g(Xt) ≡ g ∈ R+
the average duration of debt is equal to 1/g, and in an infinitesimal time interval [t, t + dt] a
fraction gdt of debt is maturing. The larger is g, the more debt is maturing at the same rollover
date, and the larger is the rollover frequency of short-term debt. Therefore, for large enough
g the staggered tenor structure model and the discrete tenor structure model should result in
approximately the same value function U(t, x) for the short-term debt. This result is numeri-
cally validated in Figure 8. The number of rollover dates in the discrete tenor structure model is
fixed at N = 1000, and the intensity of the Cox process in the staggered tenor structure model
varies from g = 0.2 to g = 200. This supports our previous discussion of the kink in the default
probabilities for the staggered tenor structure visible in Figures 6(a) and 6(b) where g(x) = 0.2.
When increasing the intensity to g(x) = 0.4 as in Figures 6(c) and 6(d) the above discussed
effect becomes less prominent and the default probability in the staggered tenor structure and
the discrete tenor structure case are much closer.
[Insert Figure 8 here.]
In section 3.1, we derived the debt run barrier for the discrete tenor structure by deter-
mining the threshold ratio x∗ such that U(t, x∗(t)) = 1, i.e., the creditor is indifferent between
rolling over and withdrawing her funding. Similarly in Proposition 3.3, we derived the debt
run barrier for the staggered tenor structure by solving the free-boundary problem (3.6). Next,
we will investigate in Figure 9 the impact of the Cox intensity g and the rollover frequency
N on the debt run barrier. The graphs show that the discrete tenor structure model with high
rollover frequency N approximates the staggered tenor structure model with large intensity g(x).
[Insert Figure 9 here.]
4 Optimal Stochastic Control Formulation
In this section we are concerned with whether the representative short-term creditor’s decision
is optimal. Intuitively, since the creditor’s decision follows the DPP, her decision should be
optimal. The question then is, what is the corresponding optimal stochastic control problem?
To answer this question we first investigate the case of the discrete tenor structure and then
discuss the staggered debt structure.
4.1 Discrete Tenor Structure
Let us first consider the case of the discrete tenor structure, i.e., short-term debt maturities
{Tn}n≥1 are a sequence of deterministic numbers. Recall that at each rollover date Tn, the
creditor believes that there is a probability (1 − θ(XTn)) that the firm may default due to debt
runs. Let T∗ denote the time that the firm defaults due to a debt run. Hence, T∗ is a random
time taking value in {Tn}n≥1.
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Let τ ∈ {Tn}n≥1\T∗ be the time at which the representative short-term creditor decides to
withdraw her funding and to run on the firm. This is an Ft-stopping time. We first consider the
case {τIns < T }, i.e., the firm fails due to insolvency before its project expires. If τ < T∗ ∧ τ
Ins,
the creditor withdraws her funding before an illiquidity or insolvency default happens. In this
case she will obtain the payoff
1{τ<T∗∧τIns}e
rSτ .
If T∗ < τ ∧ τ
Ins, the firm fails due to the debt run before the creditor decides to withdraw her
money and before an insolvency happens. Hence, the creditor will obtain the payoff
1{T∗<τ∧τIns}e
rST∗RT∗ .
Finally, if τIns ≤ T∗ ∧ τ , the firm defaults due to insolvency before the illiquidity default takes
place and before the creditor decides to withdraw her funding. Then, the creditor will obtain
the payoff
1{τIns≤T∗∧τ}e
rSτ
Ins
RτIns .
On the other hand, on the event {τIns ≥ T }, i.e., no insolvency happens before the project ends,
the creditor will obtain the payoff
1{τ<T∗∧T}e
rSτ + 1{T∗<τ∧T}e
rST∗RT∗ + 1{T≤T∗∧τ}e
rST min{1, XT/(1 + lT )}.
Table 2 summarizes the aggregate payoff of the representative creditor.
Table 2: Representative creditor’s aggregate payoff
Insolvency time τ Ins Decision time τ Payoff
τ Ins < T τ < T∗ ∧ τ
Ins erSτ · 1
T∗ < τ ∧ τ
Ins erST∗ · RT∗
τ Ins ≤ T∗ ∧ τ e
rSτ
Ins
· RτIns
τ Ins ≥ T τ < T∗ ∧ τ
Ins erSτ · 1
T∗ < τ ∧ T e
rST∗ · RT∗
T ≤ T∗ ∧ τ e
rST ·min{1, XT /(1 + lT )}
For any 0 ≤ t ≤ tˆ ≤ T where tˆ could be either τIns or T , we define the aggregate discounted
payoff from time t to tˆ as6
At,tˆ = 1{t<τ<T∗∧tˆ}e
(rS−r)(τ−t) + 1{t<T∗<τ∧tˆ}e
(rS−r)(T∗−t)RT∗ + 1{t<tˆ≤T∗∧τ}e
(rS−r)(tˆ−t)Rtˆ.
The creditor will choose an optimal Ft-stopping time to maximize her expected payoff
sup
τ∈{Tn}n≥1\T∗
Ex0
{
1{τIns<T} · A0,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · A0,T
}
. (4.1)
The following theorem states that the creditor’s value function U(t, x) defined by the dynamic
programming equations (2.5) and (2.6) is indeed optimal.
6Recall that RT = min{1, XT /(1 + lT )} as defined in (2.4).
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Theorem 4.1 The value of the optimal stopping time problem (4.1) is given by the value function
U(0, x) in the dynamic programming equation (2.6). The optimal stopping time is given by the
earliest maturity date at which the firm fundamental falls below the debt run barrier determined
in section 3.1, i.e.,
τRun = inf{Tn : VTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
, n = 0, 1, . . . , N} ∧ T.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
4.2 Staggered Tenor Structure
Next we consider the case of the staggered tenor structure, i.e., the maturities {Tn}n≥1 are
the arrival times of a Cox process with intensity g(Xt). Similar to the discrete tenor structure,
we define T∗ as the default time due to a debt run. Since T∗ is chosen among the Cox arrival
times {Tn}n≥1 with probability (1 − θ(XTn)), it is well known that T∗ is the first arrival time
of another Cox process with intensity g(Xt)(1 − θ(Xt)). Let τ ∈ {Tn}n≥1\T∗ again denote the
rollover date at which the representative short-term creditor decides to withdraw her funding
and to run on the firm. This is a Gt = Ft∨Ht-stopping time under the staggered tenor structure
with Ht = σ({T1 ≤ u} : u ≤ t), i.e., τ must be chosen from the arrival times of the Cox process,
The representative short-term creditor will choose an optimal Gt-stopping time to maximize
her expected payoff
sup
τ∈{Tn}n≥1\T∗
Ex0
{
1{τIns<T} · A0,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · A0,T
}
. (4.2)
In contrast to the previous section on the discrete tenor structure, the optimal stopping time
problem (4.2) can now only be stopped at the Cox random times {Tn}n≥1\T∗. Hence, knowing
only the Brownian filtration {Ft} is certainly not enough to decide when to stop; one has to
know the additional filtration {Ht} from the Cox process in order to determine when to stop.
Similar to the case of the discrete tenor structure, we can show that the solution to this optimal
stopping time problem is given by the dynamic programming equation (3.2).
Theorem 4.2 The value of the optimal stopping time problem (4.2) is given by the value function
U(0, x) in the dynamic programming equation (3.2). The optimal stopping time is given by
the earliest maturity date such that the firm fundamental falls below the debt run barrier in
Proposition 3.3:
τRun = inf{Tn : VTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
} ∧ T.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
4.3 Another Look at Default Mechanism
By deriving the debt run barrier and illiquidity barrier from the DPP, together with the
exogenous insolvency barrier, we obtain the default mechanism in both Theorems 3.1 and 3.4.
In this section, from the optimal stopping representation of debt runs in both Theorems 4.1
and 4.2, we can interpret the default mechanism from the optimal stochastic control viewpoint
as follows. The representative creditor will choose an optimal rollover date to withdraw her
funding, i.e. to run on the firm. For the case of discrete tenor structure, the creditor will choose
an optimal stopping time from a sequence of deterministic times. For the case of staggered
tenor structure, the creditor will choose an optimal stopping time from a sequence of Cox arrival
times. At each rollover date, she can only make her decision if the firm is solvent up to that
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date, and if the firm survives the debt run by other creditors (based on her belief ξ). What
we have shown is that the DPP used to derive the debt run barrier strategy corresponds to a
non-standard optimal stopping time problem. Therein, the bankruptcy time due to debt runs
T ∗ is based on the creditor’s belief ξ, so it is not necessarily the real bankruptcy time, and
the creditor can choose to run either before T ∗ or after T ∗. The creditor will then decide her
debt run barrier DRun based on her belief ξ, or equivalently T ∗. Since we consider the decision
problem of a representative short-term creditor, all of the short-term creditors will run on the
firm if VTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a rigorous formulation for a class of structural credit risk models
that take into account not only insolvency risk but also illiquidity risk due to possible debt runs.
We show that there exists a unique threshold strategy, i.e., a debt run barrier for short-term
creditors to decide when to withdraw their funding. This allows us to decompose the total credit
risk into an illiquidity component based on the endogenous debt run barrier and an insolvency
component based on the exogenous insolvency barrier.
The default mechanism in dynamic debt run models is mainly triggered by creditors’ runs
as shown in Morris and Shin (2010), He and Xiong (2012b), and Liang et al. (2014). This is
different from traditional structural credit risk models where the default mechanism is usually
triggered by equity holders as they either exogenously set a default barrier or endogenously
determine an optimal default barrier. Cheng and Milbradt (2012) consider decision problems of
both creditors and equity holders in the dynamic debt run setting. In this paper, we consider
that the equity holders exogenously set the insolvency barrier, while the creditors endogenously
determine the debt run barrier and the illiquidity barrier. On the other hand, most of dynamic
debt run models are based on the DPP, but up to now the corresponding optimal stochastic
control problem for the DPP in dynamic debt run models has not been specified. In this paper,
we prove that the DPP is in fact derived from a non-standard optimal stopping time problem
with control constraints and we explicitly state the associated optimal control problem. This
may help us better understand the default mechanism of debt runs.
In dynamic debt run models, one crucial assumption is the maturity structure of short-term
debt. Both He and Xiong (2012b) and Cheng and Milbradt (2012) utilize the Poisson random
maturity assumption to capture the staggered tenor structure, whereas Liang et al. (2014) assume
a sequence of deterministic rollover dates generalizing the two-period model of Morris and Shin
(2010). In this paper, we consider both discrete and staggered tenor structures. Moreover, we
show that the two tenor structures converge to each other when the rollover frequency goes to
infinity.
Finally, the representative short-term creditor’s belief about other creditors’ current and
future rollover decisions also characterizes a dynamic debt run model. In Morris and Shin (2010)
and Liang et al. (2014) such a belief is modeled by a uniformly distributed random variable. In
this paper, we generalize this assumption by modeling such a belief as a general random variable.
Furthermore, the impact of the creditors’ future rollover decisions are included by considering
the dynamic programming equation of the representative short-term creditor, which is in the
same spirit as He and Xiong (2012b). Notwithstanding, our model only takes account of other
creditors’ rollover decisions on a representative creditor, but not vice vera, by assuming her belief
exogenously, because in practice such a belief may depend on various factors that are not present
in the model such as monetary policy and the states of the economy. Hence, in this sense our
debt run model is an exogenous model rather than an equilibrium model. The corresponding
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equilibrium model could be more challenging, and is left for the future research.
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A Appendix for Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The proof is essentially the same as Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 in Liang and Jiang (2012), so we only sketch
it.
First, note that under the new coordinate x¯ = x/(βlt), the PDEs (2.7) and (2.8) become L
vWn = 0
on a regular domain [Tn, Tn+1] × [1,∞). The Green’s function G(t, x¯;Tn+1, ξ) for the operator L
v on
[Tn, Tn+1]× [1,∞) is the solution to the following PDE problem

LvG(t, x¯; Tn+1, ξ) = 0
G|x¯=1 = 0
G|t=Tn+1 = δ(x¯− ξ).
(A.1)
By making the transformation y = log(x¯/ξ), τ = Tn+1 − t, and
G(τ, y;Tn+1, ξ)
= exp
{[
rS − r −
1
2σ2
(
rV − rL −
σ2
2
)2]
τ −
1
σ2
(
rV − rL −
σ2
2
)
y
}
H(τ, y;Tn+1, ξ),
it is easy to verify that H(τ, y;Tn+1, ξ) satisfies a heat equation on the half plane. Its solution can be
easily obtained by the standard image method.
Next, given the Green’s function G(τ, y;Tn+1, ξ), we derive the solution to L
vWn = 0 on the domain
[Tn, Tn+1] × [1,∞) with the boundary and terminal data Pn and Qn by applying integration by parts.
Consider the adjoint problem of (A.1) on [t, Tn+1]× [1,∞)

LˆvGˆ(η, ξ; t, x¯) = 0
Gˆ|ξ=1 = 0
Gˆ|η=t = δ(ξ − x¯),
(A.2)
where Lˆv is the adjoint operator of Lv
Lˆv = −
∂
∂η
+
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂ξ2
ξ2 − (rV − rL)
∂
∂ξ
ξ + (rS − r).
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Since Wn(η, ξ) satisfies L
vWn = 0 and Gˆ(η, ξ; t, x¯) satisfies the adjoint equation Lˆ
vGˆ(η, ξ; t, x¯) = 0,
applying integration by parts to the integral∫ ∞
1
dξ
∫ Tn+1−ǫ
t+ǫ
[Gˆ(η, ξ; t, x¯)LvWn(η, ξ)−Wn(η, ξ)Lˆ
vGˆ(η, ξ; t, x¯)]dη,
and using the boundary and terminal data Pn and Qn forWn(η, ξ) will give us the Green’s representation
formula (2.9).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We have the following property for the first arrival time (i.e., the first short-term debt maturity) T1,
the proof of which can be found for example in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002).
Lemma A.1 The process Γ defined by Γt =
∫ t
0
g(Xs)ds for t ≥ 0 is an Ft-hazard process associated
with T1, that is,
Γt = − logQ(T1 > t|Ft) = − logQ(T1 > t|F∞).
Moreover, for any Ft-adapted process Yt and Ft-stopping time τ , on the event {T1 > t},
E[1{T1≥τ}Yτ | Ft] = E
[
Yτe
−
∫ τ
t g(Xs)ds | Ft
]
. (A.3)
E
[
1{t<T1<τ}YT1 | Ft
]
= E
[∫ τ
t
Yse
−
∫ s
t g(Xu)dug(Xs)ds | Ft
]
. (A.4)
In the following, we employ the distribution of T1 given by Lemma A.1 to calculate (3.2). For the
first and the third terms, by using (A.4), we obtain
E
x
t
{
1{t<T1<τIns∧T}e
(rS−r)(T1−t) [θ(XT1)max {1, U(T1, XT1 )}+ (1− θ(XT1))RT1 ]
}
= Ext
{∫ τIns∧T
t
e
∫ s
t (rS−r−g(Xu))dug(Xs)
× [θ(Xs)max{1, U(s,Xs)}+ (1− θ(Xs))αXs/(1 + ls)] ds} .
For the second term, based on (A.3), we obtain
E
x
t
{
1{T1≥τIns,t≤τIns<T}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns
}
= Ext
{
1{t≤τIns<T}e
∫ τIns
t (rS−r−g(Xu))duαβlτIns/(1 + lτIns)
}
.
For the last term, by employing (A.3) again, we obtain
E
x
t
{
1{T1≥T,τIns≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)min {1, XT /(1 + lT )}
}
= Ext
{
1{τIns≥T}e
∫ T
t (rS−r−g(Xu))dumin {1, XT /(1 + lT )}
}
.
By combing the above three equalities, we finally derive
U(t, x) = Ext
{∫ τIns∧T
t
e
∫ s
t (rS−r−g(Xu))dug(Xs)
× [θ(Xs)max{1, U(s,Xs)}+ (1− θ(Xs))αXs/(1 + ls)] ds.
+ 1{t≤τIns<T}e
∫ τIns
t (rS−r−g(Xu))duαβlτIns/(1 + lτIns)
+ 1{τIns≥T}e
∫ T
t (rS−r−g(Xu))dumin {1, XT /(1 + lT )}
}
.
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Then similar to Proposition 2.1, the Feynman-Kac formula gives us the PDE representation for the
value function U(t, x) under the Cox maturity structure as provided in Proposition 3.2.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
For n = 0, 1, . . . , N , we consider a sequence of optimal stopping time problems
V (Tn, x) = sup
τ∈{Tn+1,Tn+2,...}\T∗
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<T} · ATn,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn,T
}
,
where τ is an Ft-stopping time taking value in {Tn+1, Tn+2, . . .}\T∗. Then the value of the optimal
stopping time problem (4.1) is given by V (0, x), and we want to show that V (0, x) = U(0, x).
Obviously we have V (TN , x) = U(TN , x), since there is no optimization problem involved in V (TN , x)
which is
V (TN , x) = E
x
TN
{
1{TN≤τIns<T}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−TN )RτIns + 1{τIns≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−TN )RT
}
.
The idea is to introduce a sequence of auxiliary optimal stopping time problems whose optimal stopping
times are also permitted to stop at the initial time Tn.
Vˆ (Tn, x) = sup
τ∈{Tn,Tn+1,...}\T∗
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<T} · ATn,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn,T
}
.
We have the following relationship between Vˆ and V (see Liang (2013)):
Vˆ (Tn, x) = θ(x)max{1, V (Tn, x)}+ (1− θ(x))RTn , for n = 0, 1, . . . , N. (A.5)
For n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, by taking conditional expectation on FTn+1 in V (Tn, x), we obtain
V (Tn, x) = sup
τ
E
x
Tn

E

1{Tn≤τIns<T} · ATn,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡I
|FTn+1




= sup
τ
E
x
Tn
{
E
[(
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1} + 1{τIns≥Tn+1}
)
× I |FTn+1
]}
= sup
τ
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns
+ 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−Tn)E
[
1{Tn+1≤τIns<T} · ATn+1,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn+1,T |FTn+1
]}
= sup
τ
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns
+ 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−Tn)E
XTn+1
Tn+1
[
1{Tn+1≤τIns<T} · ATn+1,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn+1,T
]}
,
where we used the Markovian property for X in the last equality. Note that the first term in the bracket
does not involve the stopping time τ , so the supremum over τ only takes action on the second term and
V (Tn, x) is equal to
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns + 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−Tn)
× sup
τ∈{Tn+1,Tn+2,...}\T∗
E
XTn+1
Tn+1
[
1{Tn+1≤τIns<T} · ATn+1,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · ATn+1,T
]}
,
which, according to the definition of Vˆ , is
E
x
Tn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns + 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−Tn)Vˆ (Tn+1, XTn+1)
}
.
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By the relationship (A.5), we obtain the recursive formulation for V (Tn, x):
V (Tn, x)
= ExTn
{
1{Tn≤τIns<Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−Tn)RτIns
+ 1{τIns≥Tn+1}e
(rS−r)(Tn+1−t)
[
θ(XTn+1)max{1, V (Tn+1, XTn+1)}+ (1− θ(XTn+1))RTn+1
]}
.
We recognize that the above equation is just the dynamic programming equation for U(t, x) in (2.6). Since
we have already proved V (TN , x) = U(TN , x), by proceeding backwards we obtain V (0, x) = U(0, x).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Theorem 4.1. For any t ≥ 0, by letting X start
from Xt = x and {Tn}n≥0 start from T0 = t, we consider a family of optimal stopping problems
V (t, x) = sup
τ∈{Tn}n≥1\T∗
E
x
t
{
1{t≤τIns<T} · At,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · At,T
}
,
where τ is a Gt-stopping time taking value in {Tn}n≥1\T∗. Therefore, τ is not allowed to stop at the
starting time t. The value of the optimal stopping time problem (4.2) is given by V (0, x), and we want
to prove that V (0, x) = U(0, x).
Similarly to the case of the discrete tenor structure, we introduce a family of auxiliary optimal stopping
time problems where the optimal stopping times are also allowed to stop at the starting time t
Vˆ (t, x) = sup
τ∈{Tn}n≥0\T∗
E
x
t
{
1{t≤τIns<T} · At,τIns + 1{τIns≥T} · At,T
}
.
We have the following relationship between Vˆ and V (see Liang (2013)):
Vˆ (t, x) = θ(x)max{1, V (t, x)}+ (1− θ(x))Rt for t ∈ [0, T ). (A.6)
Taking expectations conditional on XT1 in V (t, x) and using the strong Markov property for X, we
obtain for any t ∈ [0, T )
V (t, x) = sup
τ
E
x
t
{
E
[
(1{t<T1<τIns} + 1{T1≥τIns})1{t≤τIns<T} · At,τIns
+ (1{t<T1<T} + 1{T1≥T})1{τIns≥T} · At,T |XT1
]}
=sup
τ
E
x
t
{
E
[
1{t≤τIns<T}1{t<T1<τIns}At,τIns |XT1
]
+ 1{t≤τIns<T}1{T1≥τIns}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns
+ E
[
1{τIns≥T}1{t<T1<T}At,T |XT1
]
+ 1{τIns≥T}1{T1≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)RT
}
=sup
τ
E
x
t
{
1{t<T1<τIns∧T}e
(rS−r)(T1−t)E
[
1{T1≤τIns<T}AT1 ,τIns + 1{τIns≥T}AT1,T |XT1
]
+ 1{t≤τIns<T}1{T1≥τIns}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns + 1{τIns≥T}1{T1≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)RT
}
=sup
τ
E
x
t
{
1{t<T1<τIns∧T}e
(rS−r)(T1−t)E
XT1
T1
[
1{T1≤τIns<T}AT1 ,τIns + 1{τIns≥T}AT1,T
]
+ 1{t≤τIns<T}1{T1≥τIns}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns + 1{τIns≥T}1{T1≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)RT
}
,
which by the definition of Vˆ is equal to
E
x
t
{
1{t<T1<τIns∧T}e
(rS−r)(T1−t)Vˆ (T1, XT1)
+ 1{t≤τIns<T}1{T1≥τIns}e
(rS−r)(τ
Ins−t)RτIns + 1{τIns≥T}1{T1≥T}e
(rS−r)(T−t)RT
}
.
The result then follows from the relationship (A.6).
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B Appendix for the Numerical Approximation of the So-
lution to PDE (3.3)
We first transform PDE (3.3) by defining y = log(x/βlt), τ = T − t and u(τ, y) = U(t, x). Then PDE
(3.3) reduces to
∂u
∂τ
=
1
2
σ2
∂2u
∂y2
+ (rV − rL −
1
2
σ2)
∂u
∂y
+ (rs − r − ζ)u+ ηmax{1, u}+ κ, (B.1)
where
ζ(τ, y) = g(x); η(τ, y) = g(x)θ(x); κ(τ, y) = g(x)(1− θ(x))αx/(1 + lt),
with boundary and initial conditions
u(τ, 0) = αβlT−τ/(1 + lT−τ ) = P (τ ) = P ;
u(0, y) = min{1, eyβlT /(1 + lT )} = Φ(y) = Φ.
In the following, we derive the implicit finite difference equation for PDE (B.1). Let ∆τ denote the
step size between two updates of the value function u in the time dimension. Similarly, ∆y denotes the
step size between grid points in the space dimension of the value function u. The relevant range of two
variables is taken to be
(τ, y) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, y¯],
where y¯ is a large constant such that realization of y outside the region [0, y¯] occurs with negligible
probability. At each grid point, we define
unj = u(n∆τ, j∆y);
and the implicit finite difference equation for (B.1) is
un+1j − u
n
j
∆τ
=
1
2
σ2
un+1j+1 − 2u
n+1
j + u
n+1
j−1
∆y2
+ (rV − rL −
1
2
σ2)
un+1j+1 − u
n+1
j−1
2∆y
+ (rs − r − ζ
n+1
j )u
n+1
j + η
n+1
j max{1, u
n+1
j }+ κ
n
j , (B.2)
where
ζnj = G(n∆τ, j∆y); η
n
j = η(n∆τ, j∆y); κ
n
j = F (n∆τ, j∆y)
for 0 ≤ n ≤ T/∆τ and 0 ≤ j ≤ y¯/∆y. The corresponding boundary and initial conditions are
u0 = P ; uy¯/∆y = 0; u
0 = Φ,
where P and Φ, with abuse of notation, denote the vectors containing the discrete values of the boundary
and initial conditions, respectively.
The implicit finite difference equation (B.2) can be rewritten as the following nonlinear algebraic
equation:
Aun+1 − (ηn+1,max{1, un+1}) = κn, (B.3)
where κn =
1
∆τ
un + κn − [cP, 0, 0, . . . , 0]∗, and A is a tridiagonal matrix:
A =


a1 b 0 . . . 0
c a2 b . . . 0
0 c a3 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . ay¯/∆y−2 b
0 0 . . . c ay¯/∆y−1


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with
aj =
1
∆τ
+
σ2
∆y2
− (rS − r − ζ
n+1
j );
b = −
1
2
σ2
∆y2
−
1
2∆y
(rV − rL −
1
2
σ2),
c = −
1
2
σ2
∆y2
+
1
2∆y
(rV − rL −
1
2
σ2).
Finally, for n = 0, 1, . . . , T/∆τ , we use the standard Newton method to solve the nonlinear algebraic
equation (B.3) as follows.
• Set v1 = un;
• For m = 1, 2, . . ., solve vm+1 recursively by the corresponding linear equation for (B.3)
Avm − (ηn+1,max{1, vm}) − κ¯n +Bn+1m (v
m+1 − vm) = 0
until sup |vm+1 − vm| < ǫ, where
Bn+1m = A− η
n+1


1{vm
1
>1} 0 . . . 0 0
0 1{vm
2
>1} 0 . . . 0
0 0
. . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 1{vm
y¯/∆y−1
>1}


• Suppose the above loop runs M times. Then set un+1 = vM .
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Figure 2: Scenarios at each rollover date Tn
Solvent at Tn?
(i.e. VTn ≥ D
Ins
Tn
?)
uu❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
**❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
no

yes

Insolvency default
Debt run at Tn?
(i.e. VTn ≤ D
Run
Tn
?)
tt✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐✐
✐

no

yes

No default
Enough liquid capital to pay off
maturing short-term debt?
(i.e. VTn ≥ D
Ill
Tn
?)
 ))❙
❙❙
❙❙
❙❙
❙❙
❙❙
❙❙
❙❙
yes

no

No default
Illiquidity
default
29
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
t
V Debt run
Illiquidity default
Insovency default
Figure 3: Scenario simulation with discrete tenor structure
The figure shows three simulated asset value paths in the model with a discrete tenor structure, where
volatility σ = 0.4, expected return rate rV = −0.02, market interest rate r = 0.01, short-term rate
rS = 0.03, and long-term rate rL = 0.05. The initial values of short- and long-term debt are set to
S0 = 2 and L0 = 2, respectively. The safety covenant parameter β = 0.4, the bankruptcy cost parameter
α = 0.6, and the fire-sale rate is set to ψ = 0.6. The time horizon is T = 10 years. In this discrete tenor
structure setting the number of rollover dates is set to N = 4. The dotted line describes the debt run
barrier, the dashed line the illiquidity barrier, and the solid line the insolvency barrier.
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Figure 4: Scenario simulation with a staggered tenor structure
The figure shows three simulated asset value paths in the model with a staggered tenor structure where
volatility σ = 0.4, expected return rate rV = −0.02, market interest rate r = 0.01, short-term rate
rS = 0.03, and long-term rate rL = 0.05. The initial values of short- and long-term debt are set to
S0 = 2 and L0 = 2, respectively. The safety covenant parameter β = 0.4, the bankruptcy cost parameter
α = 0.6, and the fire-sale rate is set to ψ = 0.6. The time horizon is T = 10 years. In this staggered
tenor structure setting the intensity of the Cox process is chosen to be g(Xt) ≡ 0.4. The dotted line
describes the debt run barrier, the dashed line the illiquidity barrier, and the solid line the insolvency
barrier.
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Figure 5: Comparison of debt run barriers with different assumptions on ξ
The figure shows debt run barriers with different assumptions on the random variable ξ, the creditor’s
belief on the proportion of short-term creditors not rolling over their funding at each rollover date.
The top line corresponds to the uniformly distributed ξ, and from the second top to the bottom lines,
they correspond to the truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 and diminishing variances. Other
parameters are the same as in Figure 4.
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(a) For σ = 0.2 and g(x) = 0.2
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(b) For σ = 0.2 and g(x) = 0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
V
PD
 
 
Staggered Tenor Structure
Discrete Tenor Structure
Pure Insolvency without Considering Liquidity Risk
(c) For σ = 0.4 and g(x) = 0.2
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(d) For σ = 0.4 and g(x) = 0.4
Figure 6: Default probabilities under the discrete and the staggered tenor structure models
The figure shows the default probabilies under the discrete tenor structure and the staggered tenor
structure. The dotted line is the default probability without including rollover risk. Other parameters
are the same as in Figure 3 and Figure 4 apart from T = 5 and rV = 0.07 and with volatility σ and
intensity g(x) as specified below the graphs.
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(a) For σ = 0.2 and g(x) = 0.4
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(b) For σ = 0.4 and g(x) = 0.2
Figure 7: Default probabilities for different fire-sale rates
The figure shows the default probabilies for different fire-sale rates. Other parameters are the same as
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 apart from T = 5 and rV = 0.07 and with volatility σ and intensity g(x) as
specified below the graphs.
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Figure 8: Influence of the intensity on creditor’s value function
The figure shows the representative creditor’s value function at time t = 0 for increasing initial asset
value V0 in the discrete tenor structure model with N = 1000 rollover dates and for the staggered tenor
structure model for different intensities g of the Cox process. Other parameters are the same as in
Figure 4.
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Figure 9: Comparison between the discrete and the staggered tenor structure models
The figure shows the debt run barrier depending on time t for different rollover frequencies N in the
discrete tenor structure model and for different intensities g(x) of the Cox process in the staggered tenor
structure model. Other parameters are the same as in Figure 4.
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